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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite its recent economic successes, India continues to have a vast underclass where 
children do not go to school or are forced to drop out early. In this paper, I describe a new 
plan to attract “for profit” private sector investment into the education of our poorest and 
most vulnerable children who, given current realities, are unlikely to make their way out of 
the poverty trap anytime soon. 
 
The idea is radical but at its core the plan is simple. Recognising that the private sector can 
work wonders when there is a profit motive involved, this paper proposes that the Indian 
government should invite them to set up quality schools for India’s poorest with the incentive 
that as when these children grow up and start earning their livelihood, the income tax they 
pay to the federal government over their lifetime would go to the entity that nurtured and 
educated them. 
 
The financial viability of the model under Indian conditions is considered at Appendix A 
(pp.12-17).  Appendix B describes a workable mode—with returns to investors captured from 
future income tax payments—to attract corporate investment in financing college education 
for talented, but poor, American students.   
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 “Today, just about everything is becoming a commodity, except imagination, 
except the ability to spark new ideas.” 
 
Thomas Friedman, “America’s Real Dream Team”,  
New York Times, March 20, 2010 
 
 
1. Background  
 
There is just no denying that despite India’s recent economic achievements, large sections of 
its population continue to see little improvement in their day-to-day lives. What is worse, 
they also have very little hope of a better future. A telling statistic is the continuing and 
widespread prevalence of malnutrition among children in India. At more than 40 percent (and 
greater than in sub-Saharan Africa), it is the surest indicator of the blighted future that lies in 
wait for so many (see Sengupta, 2009). The problem is not just that so much poverty exists, 
but that given current realities, it is likely to be handed down as a cruel legacy from poor 
parents to children who remain poor because they would lack the skills to pull themselves up; 
either they do not go to school or they are forced to drop out early on. 
 
In a paper dealing with education and poor households in India, Pradhan and Subramanian 
(1999, p.3) put this problem into perspective:  
Despite much [sic] initiatives through universalisation of primary education, the 
number of illiterate persons aged seven and above increased from 350 million in 1981 
to 371 million in 1991. According to the MIMAP survey (NCAER, 1998) for the year 
1994-95, 49.3 per cent and 16.8 per cent in rural and urban areas, respectively are 
unable to read and write. One-third of the children aged 6-14 years were out of 
school. Some obvious explanation for poor enrolment rate and high dropout rate in the 
literature is attributed to poverty, and child labour supplementing family income is 
considered to be the cause for such maladies. 
 
In the decade since, a lot of ground has been covered in cutting down on the percentage of 
children not attending school. The Annual Status of Education Report for 2009 brought out 
by the NGO Pratham2 says that nationally the proportion of 6-14 year-olds not in school is 
now down to four percent. However, whether this translates into meaningful improvements in 
learning is a different matter altogether. 
 
 
2. Why the Private Sector 
  
We know from experience there are limits to what the government can do. The Indian story, 
in common with many other countries, has been that government efforts have in-built 
elements of waste, graft and other leakages that compel the use of disproportionate resources 
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to achieve even modest goals. In early 2008, the New York Times carried a grim story 
detailing how India’s poor are being hard-done by a woefully inept public education system:  
Sixty years after independence, with 40 percent of its population under 18, India is 
now confronting the perils of its failure to educate its citizens, notably the poor. More 
Indian children are in school than ever before, but the quality of public schools […] 
has sunk to spectacularly low levels, as government schools have become reserves of 
children at the very bottom of India’s social ladder (Sengupta, 2008). 
 
Referring further to a survey conducted across 16,000 villages in 2007 by Pratham, the article 
goes on to serve this stark indictment:  
While many more children were sitting in class, vast numbers of them could not read, 
write or perform basic arithmetic, to say nothing of those who were not in school at 
all. Among children in fifth grade, 4 out of 10 could not read text at the second grade 
level, and 7 out of 10 could not subtract. The results reflected a slight improvement in 
reading from 2006 and a slight decline in arithmetic; together they underscored one of 
the most worrying gaps in India’s prospects for continued growth (Sengupta, 2008). 
 
To someone living in India and even cursorily aware of the wider realities, the report would 
come as no surprise. It is amply clear that after 60 years of trying, government efforts have 
just not made the headway expected of it. What is more, there is little reason to hope that in 
the years ahead, anything by way of more of the same can lead to a better outcome. It also 
follows that for any meaningful change to come about, greater private sector investment and 
involvement to supplement (even substitute) the efforts of the government is a must.  
 
This is not to suggest that the private sector is now uninvolved in this sector, or, that it is not 
doing good work already. Indeed, this is a misconception that Tooley (2000) takes pains to 
dispel: “A common assumption about the private sector in education is that it caters only for 
the élite, and that its promotion would only serve to exacerbate inequality.  On the contrary, 
recent research points in the opposite direction. If we want to help some of the most 
disadvantaged groups in society, then encouraging deeper private sector involvement is likely 
to be the best way forward.”  
 
However, it is also true that much of the existing private effort in education for the poor 
acclaimed by Tooley is directed towards those who, whilst poor, can still afford to pay 
relatively small amounts towards fees. It leaves out in the cold sizable numbers where parents 
are too poor to even feed their children properly and where children are often expected to 
work and contribute to the family income.  
 
What can private enterprise and initiative do for them? 
 
Essentially, this is a question that boils down to: How do you draw the interest of the private 
sector into ventures that offer no profits and therefore no motives other than charity and the 
missionary zeal? Without a clear-cut answer, this field will continue to be the preserve of 
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religious establishments, NGOs and other institutions operating largely as charities. And 
since there are natural constraints to how much (and how fast) charity can be scaled up, such 
efforts, commendable in themselves, are doomed to inadequacy in the face of the ever 
mounting challenges. 
 
 
3. A radical plan 
 
Here, then, is a new idea. Recognizing that the private sector can work wonders when there is 
a profit motive at work, this paper proposes that the Indian government should invite them to 
set up quality schools for the poorest of the poor—or pay for their quality education—with 
the incentive that as when such children grow up and start earning their livelihood, the 
income tax paid by them to the federal government over their life-time would go to the entity 
that nurtured and educated them. 
 
The basic idea—of enlisting the services of a more efficient private sector for an identified 
national cause by offering them a share of the future gains that accrue from the venture—is 
actually not very new. For instance, the thought behind getting private entities to build roads 
(or other physical infrastructure) by allowing them to collect and keep the toll is very similar. 
The difference now is about extending this concept towards building our human capital. True, 
it has never been tried before, but there are close parallels to suggest that given a try it can 
work very well. 
 
Consider, for instance, the example of the petroleum industry. This field has long been 
dominated by privately owned multi-national oil companies that operate under some of the 
most strenuous conditions. Petroleum exploration and production is necessarily a high risk 
business venture due to multiple risks and uncertainties. Very often, the oil-rich countries 
lack expertise to develop their reserves themselves and fall back on royalty or production-
sharing agreements—the capital is brought in by the oil companies in return for a share of 
revenues once production begins. And typically, the investments required are huge. 
According to the Organisation for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): 
Oil exploration can cost tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. The actual costs 
depend on such factors as the location of possible oil reserves (i.e. on land or in deep 
water), how large the oil field is expected to be, how detailed the exploration 
information must be, and the type and structure of the rock below the ground. […] It 
is not easy to determine a typical cost of such activities (OPEC, n.d.).  
 
How long does it take to discover oil and bring it to market? OPEC is categorical that there is 
no standard answer to this question; depending on where the oil is and how difficult it is to 
discover and develop, it can take “anywhere from 3 to 10 years” from exploration, discovery, 
testing and development to the delivery of oil from a new field (OPEC, n.d.). 
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It is remarkable that an industry routinely up against a staggering array of technical, financial, 
and political challenges, and where returns get delayed up to a decade and more, has spawned 
some of the most successful and valuable companies in the world today. And the reason this 
example finds mention here is that it offers a simple and straightforward moral genuinely 
relevant to the core idea of this paper: Given the right incentives, trust the private sector to 
move mountains.  
 
 
4. The plan in practice 
 
Under this plan, the beneficiaries will bear no formal obligation whatsoever to their 
benefactors. They will not be made to sign bonds or do anything out of the way; in fact, they 
would not have any say in the matter whatsoever. Instead, using available, modern-day 
information technology, the system would maintain a centralised database that would 
automatically (or with a minimum of bureaucratic intervention) pick up the future series of 
income tax payments from them, no matter where in India they happen to be, and match it to 
their benefactors. Indeed, once the government has put in place necessary legal, 
administrative and information technology frameworks, including the criteria for determining 
eligible beneficiaries and qualified investors, the system could work pretty much on auto-
pilot. Further, with the Indian government already working on a UID project—every Indian 
citizen will soon get a unique identification number—a major technical obstacle will be 
overcome soon. 
 
The single-minded focus on the future income tax payments of the beneficiaries has two key 
advantages. First, it can easily be tracked at a centralised level. Second, it provides a ready 
and quantifiable measure of the success attained by each individual beneficiary, allowing for 
proportionate reward to the investor/benefactor, without leeway for subjectivity and 
controversy.  
 
 
5. The minutiae of implementation 
 
Yes, once it comes to implementation, there are daunting procedural, logistical and moral 
concerns that would have to be addressed. Questions to be grappled with would include the 
tricky, finer details like: Should it be the whole amount of the income tax paid or only a part? 
Should it really last for a lifetime or for a pre-determined period? How do we ensure that only 
the genuinely poor benefit? What are the potential loopholes that would allow the 
unscrupulous to subvert the system?  
 
Here is a sample list, by no means exhaustive, of questions that require clarity before any 
attempt at implementation: 
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a. Should it be the whole amount of the income tax paid or only a part?  (Perhaps there 
can be some gradation based on, say, how long the particular beneficiary was 
supported.) 
b. Should it be for the lifetime or for a shorter pre-defined period? (The lifetime payment 
goes a long way in making the idea a viable business proposition. Indeed, considering 
the risks, the delayed returns, and the gambler’s instinct that drives investments into 
risky ventures, capping the upside potential may well deal a death blow to the plan.) 
c. How do you ensure that only the very poorest benefit? (Actually, there is no real harm 
even if the less poor were to benefit. Anyone whose future income based on present 
trends is likely to fall short of the tax-paying band should be made eligible—the 
government loses nothing, even as large numbers of its poorer citizens gain.) 
d. What about children who do so well that they get jobs abroad and do not pay any tax 
here? (Every system will have loopholes. Maybe, over time, this can become an 
international agreement with the U.S. and the European Union governments agreeing 
to pass on some of the taxes earned from beneficiaries who immigrate to those 
countries. Should this happen, it would be a powerful, additional incentive in the 
system.) 
e. How about someone who becomes successful, yet evades taxes? (One hopes the 
numbers remain small so that the overall outcome is not unduly affected.) 
f. In practice, won’t this model end up as an exercise in “cream skimming”, where 
children with intelligence and potential get cherry-picked while the majority are left 
out? (It would still amount to a worthwhile beginning.) 
g. What about the problem of convincing destitute parents to let go of their children 
when they are required to contribute to the family income or help out with domestic 
chores? (Here are two reasons why it may not be serious. First, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that most parents can be educated about the long term benefits of putting 
their children through school, and beyond. Second, a family with many children 
[pretty much the norm among the poor] should have no problems conceding one of 
them to an initiative under this plan. However, it may be sensible to have some form 
of binding “guardianship” rights for the investor written into the legal framework 
around the plan to guard against parents withdrawing their children midway through 
out of impatience or any other peeves.)  
h. Considering the timeframes, is not the narrow focus on income tax a major risk? What 
if the income tax rates are sharply reduced? (The income tax rates will not matter so 
much as the amounts that are actually collected. A greater risk is the tendency to 
increase the threshold income up to which no tax is payable. So long as this is done to 
adjust for inflation, there is no real loss involved.) 
i. Can the unscrupulous possibly abuse or “game” the system in some way or other? 
(Certainly, there will be loopholes but as long as the gains run well ahead of the costs, 
there should be no undue worries.) 
j. Isn’t the government—whose duty it is to ensure universal education—abdicating its 
responsibilities? (Social and economic policies can be framed based on how things are 
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[the reality] or how things should be [the ideal]. There is no doubt which one works 
better.) 
 
 
6. Accepting the core idea is the real challenge 
 
Perhaps more than the procedural and logistical challenges, the critical concern is reconciling 
to the idea of private players motivated not by charity or the goodness of their hearts, but by 
future profits. Yes, this plan is also about bringing in the element of windfall gains into the 
education of our poorest children. Much in the way that privately owned companies drill for 
oil and continue to drill even after some wells turn out dry, private entities would have a 
powerful incentive to look after some of our most disadvantaged children and their families 
and lead them out of the vicious circle of poverty. They would know that even if a handful 
could be nurtured to join the ranks of the wealthy, they would be looking at mega profits.  
 
As for the beneficiaries, every child who emerges with some degree of success would have 
pulled one family out of this vicious circle of poverty begetting more poverty. For the 
government, the only sacrifice is the loss of that future income tax revenue that most certainly 
would not have accrued but for this plan. 
 
However, acceptance of the profit motive in the area of education remains a touchy subject in 
India. After two decades of economic reforms, India still does not allow “for profit” 
organisations to invest in education—despite thousands of its finest students flocking to the 
U.S. every year to study at some of the best colleges and universities of the world that also 
happen to be run for profit.  
 
 
7. A compelling rationale 
 
In a recent Op-ed column in the Washington Post, Epstein (2009) lays out an inspiring vision 
of a corporate sector willingly stepping forward to finance college education for poor 
American students. He refers to work done by the Nobel Prize winning economist James 
Heckman suggesting that the potential return on investment in the education of young 
children can be as high as 17 percent compounded annually and explains, “The return 
manifests itself in increased future earnings and reduced social costs. Today, that 17 percent 
compound annual growth rate is inaccessible to investors, but if people could issue shares of 
their future cash flow, it would unleash that potential, initiating a massive influx of 
investment in children.” 
 
However, even as the vision inspires, it falls short when it comes to defining a robust and 
workable method to realize the same. Epstein is focused on tax credits when the fact remains 
that this is always an unwelcome prospect for a cash-strapped government. He also refers to 
corporate investors being repaid out of the future income of the beneficiaries. This is 
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potentially a logistical nightmare: how do you enforce compliance without getting caught up 
in a tangled web?  
 
The model described in this paper addresses precisely these shortcomings, although in an 
Indian context. Appendix B describes a model to attract “for profit” investment in providing 
college education for talented but disadvantaged American students, with returns to investors 
captured from their income tax payments.   
 
 
8. The viability aspect 
 
Ultimately, an idea like this can take roots only if it appeals to those who are expected to step 
forward with their money. We have considered the viability of the model under Indian 
conditions in some detail, and we have concluded that the plan is workable and worth a try. 
Our calculations looked at a private corporate entity putting up the money to set up a network 
of 10 brand new schools dedicated to this purpose. We assume that the venture would operate 
purely on a “for profit” or commercial basis, with no concessions from the government. And 
we looked at how the returns would measure up over the long term in relation to the 
expenses. Our projections indicate that that the venture would break-even by about 17 years 
and that over the very long term it could generate very good returns with an IRR going up 
nearly to 18 percent (refer Appendix A). 
 
 
9. Will the private sector rise to the bait? 
 
Ideally, this plan should be of interest to those players with deep pockets to ride out the initial 
years. As an investment proposition, it involves spending money on the beneficiaries 
continuously for 10 to 15 years and thereafter earning an income (from the successful cases) 
for as long as 35 to 40 years. A critical milestone to reach would be the point where the first 
paybacks commence. From this point onwards, with more and more beneficiaries cascading 
into the tax paying band each year, the venture would rapidly acquire the critical mass 
necessary for sustainable and long-term financial stability.  
 
Also, there should be no underestimating the powerful lure of the potential for windfall gains 
from the outstandingly successful beneficiaries. Even at lower rates of overall success, 
investors would likely continue to line up, pulled in by the examples of those handfuls who 
have chanced to strike gold. As Levitt and Dubner (2006, p.79) point out, “[people] respond 
to incentives. So if the prize is big enough, they will form a line down the block, just hoping 
for a chance.”  
 
 
10. Gains for the government  
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The government is actually a major beneficiary because:  
  
a) It does not sacrifice current income. The future revenue to be passed on is notional because 
without this intervention it would not materialise. Also, the government will continue to earn 
from the indirect taxes and all other positive externalities contributed by (or attributable to) 
the beneficiaries.  
 
b) People who pull themselves out of poverty through education tend to ensure that their 
children also get educated. The escape from the poverty-trap becomes permanent with 
educated parents and educated children all likely to lead lives far better than what was 
originally in fate for them. Contrast this with the typical government run entitlement 
programmes targeting the poor where many of the beneficiaries would revert to poverty the 
moment the programme is discontinued. 
 
c) In India, where affirmative action is practised to benefit those at the bottom of the caste 
ladder, this plan would result in an increased pool of those qualified to take up “quota” 
positions. Therefore, it can actually take the edge off the most common criticism against 
affirmative action, that it ignores merit. 
 
 
11. Other areas where this model may apply  
 
Here are some examples that come to mind: 
 
a) Adoption and foster care: A similar incentive can be offered to encourage the adoption of 
children from the foster-care system with the adoptive parents made eligible for some (or 
even the full) share of the future income tax paid by their adopted children. In the U.S. foster-
care system, for instance, about 120,000 kids await adoption every year of whom only about 
55,000 or so actually get adopted (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). 
Moreover, payments from the state to the foster-parents cease when the child attains majority 
at 18 years of age. As a result, it is estimated that nearly 50% of the children who “age out” 
of the system become homeless (Wikepedia, n.d.). With an incentive linked to future income 
tax payments, adoptive parents would have a powerful reason to continue giving care and 
shelter (and even putting their foster-children through college), if only to better secure their 
own future prospects.  
 
b) Making NGOs and charities self-sustaining: Even now, a lot of good work in educating the 
poor is being done by NGOs and charities—despite constrained resources. These institutions 
can eventually expect to become a self sustaining model. Initially, they would depend on 
donors as usual, but later on they would have access to a regular income independent of 
donations (i.e. the income tax payments of their beneficiaries). 
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c) Opening up access to élite schools: India has many high-quality, fee-paying private schools 
that are currently restricted to the élite. Under this plan, these élite schools would have a 
powerful incentive to award scholarships and take in a certain percentage of poor students. In 
fact, they would have be at an advantage because they can get started immediately without 
investing in much of additional infrastructure. Meanwhile, their operating expenses would 
increase only to the extent of the marginal cost.   
 
 
12. A word in passing 
 
Someone who went through at an earlier draft of this article came back with an account of a 
disturbing incident he had witnessed. On a cold winter morning, he had once come across a 
thinly clad boy, perhaps six years old, alone and sifting through garbage piled on a street-
corner. Clearly, this was a rag-picker’s son getting an early start in the family profession. And 
this child, as well as all the others like him— destined to grow up and become not what their 
talent or ambition leads them to, only that what their despair will allow them to—is the one 
for whom this plan is meant;.  
 
13. Conclusion 
 
Elaborating on how the cause of the poor is, in truth, best served by the private education 
sector, Tooley (2000) asserts:  
All this evidence suggests to me that the received wisdom about the role of the private 
sector in helping the disadvantaged is completely misguided. In developing countries, 
it is not the state that has the greatest potential to help the poor, but the private sector. 
Sure, the very poorest may need additional assistance to help them attend these 
schools, in terms of public or private vouchers (or both). But the state’s major role 
should be to help ensure that the regulatory and investment climate is conducive to the 
development and nurturing of these schools. And if this is true for India, then it may 
also be true for the developed world too. 
 
However, international experience with the voucher system that Tooley endorses has been 
decidedly mixed. While it succeeds very well in improving parental choice and encouraging 
competition between schools, it has also had an indifferent to negative impact on the very 
poorest students, precisely the category targeted for improvement (see, for example, Lee & 
Wong, 2002). 
 
This is where the idea outlined in this paper holds particular promise. Even with a pinpoint 
focus on the very poorest of the poor, it pulls away decisively from the tried and failed 
government-led model to one that would co-opt the energy and purpose of the private sector. 
It seeks to do this with a path-breaking incentive mechanism offering extraordinary rewards 
for extraordinary success, at next to no cost for the government. In contrast to the voucher 
system which is all about the government spending its money more effectively, this model is 
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about the government not spending money in order to let the private sector do all the 
spending, with likely far better results. Without exaggeration, should the model work (and 
work well at that), it is potentially a game-changer, capable of transforming the fortunes of 
those in our midst today leading the bleakest, most hopeless lives.  
 
Finally, even as this paper focuses on India, the model has relevance beyond. To begin with, 
there are the other similarly placed countries of which South Africa and Brazil come readily 
to mind. Besides, there are those chronically underprivileged communities in the developed 
countries too, for example, the children of the Roma in Eastern Europe, or African-American 
kids in the depressed inner-city ghettos in the U.S. 
 
 
_______________ 
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Appendix A: The viability aspect 
 
For charities engaged in educating poor children or for private schools that take in poor 
students free of cost, this model would remain a powerful and welcome incentive irrespective 
of any other considerations of commercial viability. For the rest, here is a preliminary 
assessment of the financial viability of this model. 
 
In determining viability, we consider the example of a private corporate entity investing in 
setting up from scratch a chain of ten brand new schools, and look at how the returns would 
stack up over the long term vis-à-vis the operating expenses. We assume that the venture 
would operate purely on a “for profit” basis, with no out-of-the-way concessions from the 
government. The idea, broadly, is to arrive at what is feasible and how far the model can be 
stretched.  
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Our major conclusion is that, on the whole, the concept is economically self-sustainable 
provided we take a longer term (say, 20 years and more) perspective. Accordingly, in our 
baseline case, breakeven is achieved by about the 17th year and the long term returns are 
attractive, with an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) closer to 18 percent.  
 
1. Core assumptions 
 
Scale, facilities, students, teachers 
• The baseline case assumes investment in a chain of ten new schools set up from 
scratch. While this pushes up the investment outlay, it confers benefits of scale 
and dispersal of risks. The physical infrastructure would be utilitarian—adequate 
but without frills.  
• Students per school at steady state ~ 120/class (with 3 sections) *12classes ~ 1440 
• The first class (of 120 students) to pass out from school after completing the 12th 
standard is 5 years after start of the project (i.e. initially you have classes 1-8 and 
then keep promoting). 
• First pay back after first class passes out ~ 5-6 years afterwards (to account for 
further studies etc). 
• Teacher/student ratio of one teacher for every thirty students (about 50 teachers 
per school).  
 
Financial indices 
• Inflation is assumed at 6%.  
• Cost of equity is taken at 16%, in view of the risks and delayed returns. 
• The cost of debt is taken at 12%.  
• At a project debt/equity ratio of one, the cost of funds is accordingly 14%.  
 
Income projections 
• We start with a 2007 study about household incomes in India by the National 
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) which classifies households 
into six income categories. For each category we make assumptions, based on the 
typical occupational profile, about likely earnings at the start of career and where 
it would reach at the 10th,  20th and the 30th milestone years. In the other years, we 
assume steady increase by arithmetic progression.  
• Income tax on the projected future incomes of the beneficiaries is based on current 
rates—revision of February 2010.  
• Beneficiaries work, and pay tax, till the age of 60 years. 
 
     Table 1 below summarises these assumptions: 
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Table 1       (in constant Rupees)* 
Annual Income    Categorisation of Household Incomes in 
India/ Typical Occupations 
(NCAER classification) 
 
at start 
of career 
at 10th 
year of 
career 
at 20th 
year of 
career 
at 30th 
year of 
career 
Average 
annual 
income 
tax 
Destitute India (< Rs.70,000) 
(Subsistence farmers, landless labourers) 
Struggling India (< Rs.160,000) 
(Service workers, drivers, small farmers) 
Not projected (Income tax not paid/payable) 
Middle India (< Rs.460,000) 
(Factory workers, small shop owners, 
bank/government sector clerks) 
    
120,000  
      
250,000  
      
350,000      500,000        19,000 
Aspiring India (< Rs.800,000) 
(Junior corporate employees) 
    
200,000  
      
400,000  
      
600,000      800,000        52,000  
Upwardly Mobile India (< Rs.1,600,000) 
(IT & enabled services, senior government 
officers) 
    
400,000  
      
800,000  
   
1,500,000   1,800,000      242,000  
Global India (> Rs.1,600,000) 
(Corporate managers, small business 
entrepreneurs) 
    
600,000  
   
2,500,000  
   
5,000,000   6,000,000   1,069,000  
* One US dollar equals about Rs.46 at current exchange rates.  
 
2. The baseline case 
 
Projected earnings and expenses are based on what can realistically be expected, with no 
special or out-of-the-way efforts either at increasing incomes or reducing costs. 
 
Expenses: The school incurs an operating cost per child of about Rs.10,000 per annum.  This 
is comparable to the fees charged by middle-rung private schools in tier II and tier III cities 
(about Rs.10,000 to 12,000 per annum). 
 
Revenues: The future incomes of the students are projected conservatively. Roughly a third 
of the beneficiaries are expected to drop out or land up in low paying jobs without 
contributing to the project revenues. About half of the beneficiaries make nominal 
contributions. Only 15 percent are expected to do really well. Table 2 below sums it up. 
 
Table 2       (in constant Rupees) 
Projected Distribution 
of Beneficiaries (class 
of 120 students) 
   Household Incomes in India- 
 Categories  
% Nos. 
Annual 
income at 
start of career 
Average 
annual 
income 
Average 
annual 
income tax 
Dropouts and failures 20.0% 24 - - - 
Struggling India (< Rs.160,000) 13.3% 16 - - - 
Middle India (< Rs.460,000) 25.0% 30     120,000       352,000        19,000 
Aspiring India (< Rs.800,000) 26.7% 32     200,000       562,000        52,000  
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Upwardly Mobile India     
(<Rs.1,600,000) 12.5% 15     400,000    1,273,000      242,000  
Global India (> Rs.1,600,000) 2.5% 3     600,000    4,049,000   1,069,000  
 
Viability: With assumptions as above, breakeven is achieved by the 17th year. Returns are 
quite attractive with projected cash flows indicating an IRR of 17.74 percent and a Net 
Present Value (NPV) of about Rs.2,245 million.  
 
On the other hand, the first ten years of the project yield no income at all (and this holds true 
for the alternative scenarios as well). Besides, total outflows up to breakeven can exceed 
Rs.1,225 million (in today’s terms).  
 
3. Sensitivity  
 
a) Income distribution:  
 
Case 1: We reconsider the baseline case on the income side with the assumption that no one 
makes it to the topmost category of “Global India”—whose contribution to the project 
income far exceeds the other categories. Accordingly, this two and a half percent of the class 
is adjusted into the next lower category of “Upwardly Mobile India”. The projected cash 
flows continue to indicate a fair measure of comfort. Breakeven gets pushed back to 19 years, 
IRR is at 16.2 percent, NPV is at Rs.1,130 million and the total payouts up to breakeven is at 
Rs.1,255 million in today's terms. (Note: In this scenario and in Case 2 that follows, the cost 
structure remains the same.)  
 
Case 2: The major drag in the baseline case is that including the 20 percent dropout rate, one 
third of the total class does not contribute at all to the project. Therefore, in this scenario the 
focus is on improving viability by advancing the educational and career outcomes of the 
beneficiaries. The effort is to minimise dropouts and failures and ensure that most of the class 
graduate into the higher income bands. Yes, this is essentially cherry-picking, and while there 
may be different ways to do this, we are not fully convinced it would actually work. For 
instance, the intelligent and academically bright can be picked out early on, but the link 
between early academic promise and future earnings is tenuous. Besides, the moral 
implications may be disturbing to some.  
 
Anyway, if cherry picking can be made to work, it can significantly improve the income side 
of the venture. In this scenario, the dropout rate comes down to five percent (mainly 
unforeseen contingencies) and no one languishes in the category of “Struggling India”. 
Except for the dropouts, everyone else contributes to the project, with 30 percent in “Middle 
India”, 40 percent in “Aspiring India”, 20 percent are well-to-do in “Upwardly Mobile India” 
and the remaining five percent doing exceptionally well as “Global India”.  
 
The projected cash flows suggest a compelling business proposition. Breakeven is 
comfortable at 16 years, IRR exceeds 20 percent, NPV of projected cash flows is at Rs.5,100 
million as against total payouts up to breakeven of about Rs.1,165 million in today's terms.  
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At this point, a word in defence of cherry-picking: If this is what it takes to stir up the 
investors and drive investments into these ventures, so be it. An imperfect beginning is often 
preferable to not beginning at all. 
 
b) Increase in cost: When the baseline case is reconsidered with a 30 percent increase in the 
cost per child per year (say, by way of expenses on providing a free lunch to students), the 
annual cost of running the school goes up to Rs.18.8 million. However, the projected results 
continue to indicate viability, with breakeven pushed back to the 19th year, IRR down to 16.5 
percent with NPV of Rs.1,700 million and total payout up to breakeven at about Rs.1,620 
million (today's terms).  
 
c) Reduced cost of capital: Up to now the cost of funds has been taken at 14 percent. If this 
can be brought down (see Notes on the assumptions below), the baseline case NPV and total 
payouts until breakeven would change as given below:  
                           (Rs.million) 
Cost of Capital Baseline Case 
at 14% at 12% at 10% 
Net Present Value of  
Cash Flows  
Rs.2,245 Rs.5,900 Rs.14,700 
Total payouts up to breakeven 
(today’s terms) 
Rs.1,225 Rs.1,380 Rs.1,570 
 
 
 
4. Notes on the assumptions 
 
a) Cost of funds: Considering the risks and the extended timeframes for payback, the cost of 
equity has been considered at 16 percent while debt is pegged at 12 percent (for an overall 
cost of funds at 14 percent). 
 
In reality, the cost can be lower for two reasons. The project may qualify for long term debt at 
subsidised rates of interest available in India for infrastructure and “priority sector” lending. 
Second, it can attract low cost funds from overseas bodies—foreign governments, private 
philanthropies, even hard-nosed corporate entities keen on elevating their CSR profile.  
 
b) The employment / income aspect: India has affirmative action for those at bottom end of 
the caste ladder, officially referred to as Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled tribes (ST). 
There are quotas set apart for them at all levels of recruitment into the public sector and for 
admissions to publicly funded colleges and universities.  
 
This suggests that employment outcomes for beneficiaries can exceed expectations. Even 
without an overt caste focus, beneficiaries would be drawn mostly from the SC and ST 
communities who constitute the bulk of India’s poorest. With extra push from the quotas, 
beneficiaries would compete effectively for all jobs in the public sector. Further, India’s 
higher education sector is mostly state controlled with the best engineering, medical, law and 
management colleges run by the government and where admissions are subject to the quotas. 
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Beneficiaries would therefore stand a fair chance of entry into India’s best professional 
colleges, with lifetime impact on their career paths and incomes. 
 
c) Education after the 12th standard: Under this plan, schools take responsibility for educating 
beneficiaries up to the 12th standard. From this level onwards, it should be possible to pursue 
higher studies free of cost at the many government run colleges and universities and also be 
eligible for scholarships and loans based on merit and caste. 
 
d) Tax Rebates: The Indian tax code offers certain rebates to income tax payers based on 
approved investments, housing loan interest subvention etc. The calculations pertaining to the 
future income tax do not take this into account.  
 
e) Premature deaths, emigration etc.: No allowance has been made for the possibility of 
untimely deaths. Similarly, breaks in employment (say, a recession that puts people out of 
work) and the chances of beneficiaries emigrating have also not been factored in. On the 
other hand, the assumption that beneficiaries work until the age of 60 applies only to the 
public sector. With life expectancy steadily going up, perhaps the retirement age will also be 
extended in future. And in real life, the affluent amongst the retired would continue to pay 
income tax, albeit at lower rates. 
 
f) Uncertainties with potentially favourable impact: While many uncertainties have an 
adverse impact on the outcomes, some uncertainties may have a positive impact. For 
instance, even a handful of exceptionally successful beneficiaries can lead to windfall gains 
for the project.  In a fast growing economy where incomes are continuously increasing, it is 
reasonable to expect more and more people to enter the tax paying band every year. For 
example, income tax collections in India doubled in real terms in the decade between 1991 
and 2001. This throws up the real possibility that occupations considered low-paying and not 
paying tax in these estimates may also end up contributing to the venture in the long run. 
 
 
 
Appendix B: College for disadvantaged American students financed by “for-profit” 
private investment  
While 2.8 million students enroll in some form of higher education each year, most do 
not proceed straight through to graduation. Only one in five of those who enroll in 
two-year institutions earn an associate degree within three years, and only two in five 
of those who start four-year colleges complete their degrees within six years. 
“The conventional wisdom is that students leave school because they aren’t willing to 
work hard and aren’t really interested in more education,” said Jean Johnson, 
executive vice president of Public Agenda. “What we found was almost precisely the 
opposite. Most work and go to school at the same time, and most are not getting 
financial help from their families or the system itself.” 
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Lewin, Tamar, “College Dropouts Cite Low Money and High Stress”,              
The New York Times, 9 December, 2009 
To many young disadvantaged Americans, a college education represents the surest path to 
upward mobility in life. Yet, the fact is, college is often expensive and effectively out-of-
reach of many deserving American students. To be fair, scholarships are available but the 
numbers are not sufficient to go around. Student loans are also available but this has had the 
unwelcome consequence of many young Americans beginning their working lives under the 
shadow of a crippling debt (for example, Lieber, 2010). College drop-out rates are high 
because many students hold jobs to pay for their college and find it difficult to manage the 
pressures of both school and work (Lewin, 2009).  
Based on the idea of returns to investors captured from future income tax payments, here is a 
blueprint of a plan to enable “for profit” private investment in the college education of 
talented but disadvantaged American students. 
 
At the outset, a word about the differences in the two contexts: For private “for profit” 
investors putting money into educating India’s poorest children, the timeframes and the risks 
involved are huge, with a gap of up to fifteen years or so before the paybacks begin. Investors 
in America looking at paying for the college education of talented but deprived students do 
not run this kind of risk because they would step in only after the potential beneficiaries have 
revealed evidence of their talent and capabilities. Moreover, the duration of a typical college 
degree programme—effectively, the period of wait before the returns come through—runs to 
only about four years. Consequently, there seems no real reason to go anywhere near to the 
extent of signing away their entire future income tax or even extending the payments to their 
lifetime contributions.  
 
The two questions that now come up are how much and how far: What percentage of the 
beneficiary’s income tax contributions is to be appropriated in favour of the investor and how 
long should such appropriations continue? A useful model to consider is the production 
sharing agreements under which western oil companies operate in the oil exporting countries. 
The two relevant terms are “cost oil” and “profit oil”. Cost oil is defined as “a portion of 
produced oil that the operator applies on an annual basis to recover defined costs specified by 
a production sharing contract.” Profit oil is “the amount of production, after deducting cost 
oil production allocated to costs and expenses, which will be divided between the 
participating parties and the host government under the production sharing contract.” 3 
 
Proceeding on these lines, the simplest plan would have the government passing on the entire 
income tax proceeds in the initial years to the sponsoring corporate investor until its ‘defined’ 
costs are fully met. Afterwards, a minor share would be passed on for a limited and pre-
defined period (Having minimized the risks, the upside can be capped as well.) 
The disadvantage here is that the government’s income takes an extra hit in the early years, 
making it a difficult proposition to sell. It therefore makes sense to rework the model by 
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taking the stand that what the government passes on to investors can only be that portion of 
tax paid which can justifiably be attributed to their intervention. This would involve defining 
a particular minimum level of income tax—say the median income tax amount for 
individuals nationally—up to which no amounts will be passed on to the benefactor since no 
out-of-the-ordinary success is indicated. In other words, this defined ‘minimum’ would be the 
amount of income tax the government could reasonably have expected from the beneficiary 
even without a college degree. Tax proceeds over this defined minimum would be passed on 
in full measure to the benefactor, though how long this arrangement should hold would have 
to be decided by expert opinion drawing a line between the interests of the investors and that 
of the government. 
 
At this point, the cost of the college education to the beneficiary would amount to almost 
nothing. This has the drawback that anything given away for free soon loses value in the 
hands of the recipient. To overcome this, and to ensure that beneficiaries remain committed 
and motivated, it would be reasonable to put in place a requirement for a certain minimum 
contribution (say, 25 percent) to the total cost to be compulsorily borne by the beneficiary. 
This minimum share can be in the form of a down payment or a loan (with iron-clad 
repayment obligations).  
 
 
Appendix C: A thousand words 
 
Photo 1 
 
A rag picker takes a break from work to spend time with her children on 
this dusty pavement in the western Indian city of Baroda (Gujarat). 
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Photo 2 
 
Her daughter is at play and, for now, enjoying herself. Will she ever go 
to school? In one word:  unlikely. 
 
Photographs © by the author, 19 January, 2010 
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1
 Sankar Krishnan left McKinsey in July 2006, to set up as an independent consultant in the 
not-for-profit/ development sector in India. In 2001, he was selected by a leading Indian 
business magazine (Business Today) as one among the Top 25 leading young achievers in 
India. The report is available online at: 
http://archives.digitaltoday.in/businesstoday/20020929/cover2.html  
 
2
 Established in 1994, Pratham is now said to be the largest NGO in India working (according 
to its website) “to provide quality education to the underprivileged children of India”. The 
highlights of the ASER report for 2009 can be accessed at: 
http://www.asercentre.org/asersurvey/aser09/pdfdata/national%20highlights.pdf 
 
3
 Source: Schlumberger, n.d., Oilfield Glossary. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/search.cfm [Accessed 27 January, 2010]  
